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Abstract
Local Differential Privacy (LDP) protocols enable an untrusted data collector to perform
privacy-preserving data analytics. In particular, each user locally perturbs his/her data to
preserve privacy before sending it to the data collector, who aggregates the perturbed
data to obtain statistics of interest. Over the past several years, researchers from multiple
communities–such as security, database, and theoretical computer science– have proposed
many LDP protocols. These studies mainly focused on improving the utility of the LDP
protocols. However, the security of LDP protocols is largely unexplored.
In this work, we aim to bridge this gap. We focus on LDP protocols for frequency
estimation and heavy hitter identification, which are two basic data analytics tasks. Specif-
ically, we show that an attacker can inject fake users into an LDP protocol and the fake
users send carefully crafted data to the data collector such that the LDP protocol estimates
high frequencies for certain target items or identifies them as heavy hitters. We call our
attacks data poisoning attacks. We theoretically and/or empirically show the effectiveness
of our attacks. We also explore two countermeasures against our attacks. Our experimental
results show that they can effectively defend against our attacks in some scenarios but have
limited effectiveness in others, highlighting the needs for new defenses against our attacks.
1 Introduction
Various data breaches [1, 2, 4] have highlighted the challenges of relying on a data collector
(e.g., Equifax) to protect users’ private data. Local Differential Privacy (LDP), a variant
of differential privacy [21], aims to address such challenges. In particular, an LDP protocol
encodes and perturbs a user’s data to protect privacy before sending it to the data collector, who
aggregates the users’ perturbed data to obtain statistics of interest. Therefore, even if the data
collector is compromised, user privacy is still preserved as the attacker only has access to users’
privacy-preserving perturbed data. Because of the resilience against untrusted data collectors,
LDP has attracted increasing attention in both academia and industry. Specifically, many LDP
protocols [20, 23, 34, 64, 11, 33, 10, 67, 46, 63, 66, 77, 31, 68, 48, 9, 17, 65] have been developed in
the past several years. Moreover, some of these protocols have been widely deployed in industry
including but not limited to Google, Microsoft, and Apple. For instance, Google deployed
LDP [23] in the Chrome browser to collect users’ default homepages for Chrome; Microsoft [19]
integrated LDP in Windows 10 to collect application usage statistics; and Apple [54] adopted
LDP on iOS to identify popular emojis, which are subsequently recommended to users.
Since LDP perturbs each user’s data, it sacrifices utility of the data analytics results ob-
tained by the data collector. Therefore, existing studies on LDP mainly focused on improving
the utility via designing new methods to encode/perturb users’ data and aggregate the per-
turbed data to derive statistical results. However, the security of LDP is largely unexplored.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
02
04
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  5
 N
ov
 20
19
In this work, we aim to bridge this gap. In particular, we propose a family of attacks called
data poisoning attacks to LDP protocols. In our attacks, an attacker injects fake users to an
LDP protocol and carefully crafts the data sent from the fake users to the data collector, with
the goal to manipulate the data analytics results as the attacker desires. Specifically, we focus
on LDP protocols for Frequency Estimation and Heavy Hitter Identification, which are two basic
data analytics tasks and are usually the first step towards more advanced tasks. The goal of
frequency estimation is to estimate the fraction of users (i.e., frequency) that have a certain
item for each of a set of items, while the goal of heavy hitter identification is to only identify
the top-k items that are the most frequent among the users without estimating the items’
frequencies. Our attacks can increase the estimated frequencies for certain target items in
frequency estimation or promote the target items to be identified as top-k heavy hitters in heavy
hitter identification. Our attacks result in severe security threats to LDP-based data analytics.
For example, an attacker can promote a phishing webpage as a popular default homepage of
Chrome; an attacker can increase the estimated popularity of its (malicious) application when
LDP is used to estimate application popularity; and an attacker can manipulate the identified
and recommended popular emojis, resulting in bad user experience and frustration.
The major challenge of data poisoning attacks is that, given a limited number of fake users
an attacker can inject, what data the fake users should send to the data collector such that the
attack effectiveness is maximized. To address the challenge, we formulate our attacks as an op-
timization problem, whose objective function is to maximize the attack effectiveness and whose
solution is the data that fake users should send to the data collector. We call our optimization-
based attack Maximal Gain Attack (MGA). To better demonstrate the effectiveness of MGA,
we also propose two baseline attacks in which the fake users send randomly crafted data to
the data collector. Then, we apply our MGA and the baseline attacks to three state-of-the-art
LDP protocols for frequency estimation (i.e., kRR [34], OUE [64], and OLH [64]) and one
state-of-the-art LDP protocol for heavy hitter identification (i.e., PEM [67]).
We theoretically evaluate the effectiveness of our attacks. Specifically, we derive the fre-
quency gain of the target items, which is the difference of the target items’ estimated frequen-
cies after and before an attack. Our theoretical analysis shows that our MGA can achieve
the largest frequency gain among possible attacks. Our theoretical results also show a fun-
damental security-privacy tradeoff for LDP protocols: when an LDP protocol provides higher
privacy guarantees, the LDP protocol is less secure against our attacks (i.e., the frequency
gains are larger). Moreover, we observe that different LDP protocols have different security
levels against our attacks. For instance, OUE and OLH have similar security levels against
our attacks, and kRR is less secure than OUE and OLH when the number of items is larger
than a threshold. We also empirically evaluate our attacks for both frequency estimation and
heavy hitter identification using a synthetic dataset and two real-world datasets. Our empirical
results also show the effectiveness of our attacks. For example, on all the three datasets, our
MGA can promote 10 randomly selected target items to be identified as top-15 heavy hitters
when the attacker only injects 5% of fake users.
We also explore two countermeasures, i.e., normalization and detecting fake users, to defend
against our attacks. Specifically, in normalization, the data collector normalizes the estimated
item frequencies to be a probability distribution, i.e., each estimated item frequency is non-
negative and the estimated frequencies of all items sum to 1. Since our attacks craft the data
for the fake users via solving an optimization problem, the data from the fake users may follow
certain patterns that deviate from genuine users. Therefore, in our second countermeasure, the
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data collector aims to detect fake users via analyzing the statistical patterns of the data from
the users, and the data collector filters the detected fake users before estimating frequencies
or identifying heavy hitters. The two countermeasures can also be used together, i.e., detect-
ing fake users first and then applying normalization. Our empirical results show that these
countermeasures can effectively defend against our attacks in some scenarios. For example,
when the attacker has 10 target items, normalization can reduce the frequency gain of our
MGA to the OUE protocol from 1.58 to 0.46 and detecting fake users can reduce the frequency
gain to be almost 0 because the data collector can detect almost all fake users. However, our
attacks are still effective in other scenarios. For instance, when the attacker has 1 randomly
selected target item, our MGA to the OLH protocol still achieves a frequency gain of 0.1 even
if both countermeasures are used, where 0.1 is a large frequency gain considering the dataset
has around 100 items. Our results highlight the needs for new defenses against our attacks.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• We perform the first systematic study on data poisoning attacks to LDP protocols for
frequency estimation and heavy hitter identification.
• We show that, both theoretically and/or empirically, our attacks can effectively increase
the estimated frequencies of the target items or promote them to be identified as heavy
hitters.
• We explore two countermeasures to defend against our attacks. Our empirical results
highlight the needs for new defenses against our attacks.
2 Background and Related Work
We consider LDP protocols for two basic tasks, i.e., frequency estimation [69, 20, 23, 34, 64,
11, 33, 77, 31, 68] and heavy hitter identification [10, 67, 46]. Suppose there are n users.
Each user holds one item from a certain domain, e.g., the default homepage of a browser. We
denote the domain of the items as {1, 2, · · · , d}. For conciseness, we simplify {1, 2, · · · , d} as
[d]. In frequency estimation, the data collector (also called central server) aims to estimate
the frequency of each item among the n users, while heavy hitter identification aims to identify
the top-k items that have the largest frequencies among the n users. Frequency of an item is
defined as the fraction of users who have the item.
2.1 Frequency Estimation
An LDP protocol for frequency estimation consists of three key steps: encode, perturb, and
aggregate. The encode step encodes each user’s item into some numerical value. We denote the
space of encoded values as D. The perturb step randomly perturbs the value in the space D and
sends the perturbed value to the central server. The central server estimates item frequencies
using the perturbed values from all users in the aggregate step. For simplicity, we denote by
PE(v) the perturbed encoded value for an item v. Roughly speaking, a protocol satisfies LDP
if any two items are perturbed to the same value with close probabilities. Formally, we have
the following definition:
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Definition 1 (Local Differential Privacy). A protocol A satisfies -local differential privacy
(-LDP) if for any pair of items v1, v2 ∈ [d] and any perturbed value y ∈ D, we have:
Pr(PE(v1) = y) ≤ ePr(PE(v2) = y),
where  > 0 is called privacy budget and PE(v) is the random perturbed encoded value of an
item v.
Moreover, an LDP protocol is called pure LDP if it satisfies the following definition:
Definition 2 (Pure LDP [64]). An LDP protocol is pure if there are two probability parameters
0 < q < p < 1 such that the following equations hold for any pair of items v1, v2 ∈ [d], v1 6= v2:
Pr(PE(v1) ∈ {y|v1 ∈ S(y)}) = p (1)
Pr(PE(v2) ∈ {y|v1 ∈ S(y)}) = q, (2)
where S(y) is the set of items that a perturbed value y supports.
We note that the definition of the support S(y) depends on the LDP protocol. For instance,
for some LDP protocols [20, 64], the support S(y) of a perturbed value y is the set of items
whose encoded values could be y. For a pure LDP protocol, the aggregate step is as follows:
f˜v =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1S(yi)(v)− q
p− q , (3)
where f˜v is the estimated frequency for item v ∈ [d], yi is the perturbed value from the ith
user, and 1S(yi)(v) is an identity function, which outputs 1 if and only if yi supports item v.
Formally, the identity function 1S(yi)(v) is defined as follows:
1S(y)(v) =
{
1, if v ∈ S(y)
0, otherwise
(4)
Roughly speaking, Equation (3) means that the frequency of an item is estimated as the
fraction of users whose perturbed values support the item normalized by p, q, and n. Pure
LDP protocols are unbiased estimators of the item frequencies [64], i.e., E[f˜v] = fv, where fv
is the true frequency for item v. Therefore, we have:
n∑
i=1
E[1S(yi)(v)] = n(fv(p− q) + q). (5)
Equation (5) will be useful for the analysis of our attacks. Next, we describe three state-of-
the-art pure LDP protocols, i.e., kRR [20], OUE [64], and OLH [64]. These three protocols are
recommended for use in different scenarios. Specifically, kRR achieves the smallest estimation
errors when the number of items is small, i.e., d < 3e + 2. When the number of items is large,
both OUE and OLH achieve the smallest estimation errors. OUE has a larger communication
cost, while OLH has a larger computation cost for the central server. Therefore, when the
communication cost is a bottleneck, OLH is recommended, otherwise OUE is recommended.
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2.1.1 kRR
kRR simply randomly permutes an item to another item and sends the permuted item to the
central server.
Encode: kRR encodes an item v to itself. Therefore, the encoded space D for kRR is identical
to the domain of items, which is as follows:
D = [d]. (6)
Perturb: kRR keeps an encoded item unchanged with a probability p and perturbs it to a
different random item a ∈ D with probability q. Formally, we have:
Pr(y = a) =
{
e
d−1+e , p, if a = v,
1
d−1+e , q, otherwise,
(7)
where y is the random perturbed value sent to the central server when a user’s item is v.
Aggregate: The key for aggregation is to derive the support set. A perturbed value y only
supports itself for kRR. Specifically, we have:
S(y) = {y}. (8)
Given the support set, we can estimate item frequencies using Equation (3).
2.1.2 OUE
OUE encodes an item using one-hot encoding and perturbs the encoded binary vector bitwise.
Encode: OUE encodes an item v to a d-bit binary vector ev whose bits are all zero except
the v-th bit. The encoded space for OUE is as follows:
D = {0, 1}d, (9)
where d is the number of items.
Perturb: OUE perturbs the bits of the encoded binary vector independently. Specifically,
for each bit of the encoded binary vector, if it is 1, then it remains 1 with a probability p.
Otherwise if the bit is 0, it is flipped to 1 with a probability q. Formally, we have:
Pr(yi = 1) =
{
1
2 , p, if i = v,
1
e+1 , q, otherwise,
(10)
where the vector y = [y1 y2 · · · yd] is the perturbed value for a user with item v.
Aggregate: A perturbed value y supports an item v if and only if the v-th bit of y, denoted
as yv, equals to 1. Formally, we have:
S(y) = {v|v ∈ [d] and yv = 1}. (11)
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2.1.3 OLH
When the number of items is large, OUE incurs a large communication cost since it requires
each user to send a d-bit binary vector to the central server. OLH aims to reduce the commu-
nication cost by incurring more computational cost on the central server. In particular, OLH
uses hash functions to reduce the domain size d to a smaller size d′.
Encode: OLH leverages a family of hash functions H, each of which maps an item v ∈ [d]
to a value h ∈ [d′], where d′ < d. In particular, OLH uses d′ = e + 1 as it achieves the
best performance [64]. An example of the hash function family H could be xxhash [16] with
different seeds. Specifically, a seed is a non-negative integer and each seed represents a different
xxhash hash function. In the encode step, OLH randomly picks a hash function H from H.
When xxhash is used, randomly picking a hash function is equivalent to randomly selecting a
non-negative integer as a seed. Then, OLH computes the hash value of the item v as h = H(v).
The tuple (H,h) is the encoded value for the item v. The encoded space for OLH is as follows:
D = {(H,h)|H ∈ H and h ∈ [d′]}. (12)
Perturb: OLH only perturbs the hash value h and does not change the hash function H.
In particular, the hash value stays unchanged with probability p′ and switches to a different
value in [d′] with probability q′. Formally, we have:
Pr(y = (H, a)) =
{
e
e+d′−1 , p′, if a = H(v),
1
e+d′−1 , q′, otherwise,
(13)
where y is the perturbed value sent to the central server from a user with item v. Therefore,
the overall probability parameters p and q are:{
p = p′ = e

e+d′−1
q = 1d′ · p′ + (1− 1d′ ) · q′ = 1d′
(14)
Aggregate: A perturbed value y = (H,h) supports an item v ∈ [d] if v is hashed to h by H.
Formally, we have:
S(y) = {v|v ∈ [d] and H(v) = h}. (15)
2.2 Heavy Hitter Identification
The goal of heavy hitter identification [10, 67, 11, 63] is to identify the top-k items that are the
most frequent among the n users. A direct and simple solution is to first estimate the frequency
of each item using a frequency estimation protocol and then select the k items with the largest
frequencies. However, such method is not scalable to a large number of items. In response, a
line of works [10, 67, 11, 63] developed protocols to identify heavy hitters without estimating
item frequencies. For example, Bassily et al. [10] and Wang et al. [67] independently developed
a similar heavy hitter identification protocol, which divides users into groups and iteratively
applies a frequency estimation protocol to identify frequent prefixes within each group. Next,
we take the Prefix Extending Method (PEM) [67], a state-of-the-art heavy hitter identification
protocol, as an example to illustrate the process.
6
In PEM, each user encodes its item as a γ-bits binary vector. Suppose users are evenly
divided into g groups. In the jth iteration, users in the jth group use the OLH protocol
to perturb the first λj = dlog2 ke +
⌈
j · γ−dlog2 keg
⌉
bits of their binary vectors and send the
perturbed bits to the central server, which uses the aggregate step of the OLH protocol to
estimate the frequencies of the prefixes that extend the previous top-k prefixes. OLH instead
of OUE is used because the number of items corresponding to λj bits is 2
λj , which is often
large and incurs large communication costs for OUE. Specifically, the central server uses the
aggregate step of OLH to estimate the frequencies of the λj-bits prefixes in the following set:
Rj−1 × {0, 1}λj−λj−1 , (16)
where Rj−1 is the set of top-k λj−1-bits prefixes identified in the (j − 1)th iteration and the ×
symbol denotes Cartesian product. After estimating the frequencies of these λj-bits prefixes,
the central server identifies the top-k most frequent ones, which are denoted as the set Rj .
This process is repeated for the g groups and the set of top-k prefixes in the final iteration are
identified as the top-k heavy hitters.
2.3 Data Poisoning Attacks
Data poisoning attacks to LDP protocols: A recent work [15] studied untargeted attacks
to LDP protocols. In particular, they focused on degrading the overall performance of frequency
estimation or heavy hitter identification. For instance, they studied how an attack can impact
the L∞ distance between the estimated item frequencies before and after attack for all items. In
contrast, we study targeted attacks to increase the estimated frequencies of the attacker-chosen
target items or promote them to be identified as heavy hitters.
Data poisoning attacks to machine learning: A line of works [44, 45, 42, 49, 29, 12,
62, 43, 40, 70, 39, 36, 8, 41, 30, 50, 27, 37, 24, 72] studied data poisoning attacks to machine
learning systems. In particular, the attacker manipulates the training data such that a bad
model is learnt, which makes predictions as the attacker desires. For instance, Biggio et al. [12]
investigated data poisoning attacks against Support Vector Machines. Jagielski et al. [30]
studied data poisoning attacks to regression models. Shafahi et al. [50] proposed poisoning
attacks to neural networks, where the learnt model makes incorrect predictions only for target
testing examples. Gu et al. [27] and Liu et al. [37] proposed data poisoning attacks (also called
backdoor/trojan attacks) to neural networks, where the learnt model predicts an attacker-
chosen label for testing examples with a certain trigger. Data poisoning attacks were also
proposed to spam filters [42], recommender systems [36, 72, 24], graph-based methods [57],
etc.. Our data poisoning attacks are different from these attacks because how LDP protocols
aggregate the users’ data to estimate frequencies or identify heavy hitters is substantially
different from how a machine learning system aggregates training data to derive a model.
3 Attacking Frequency Estimation
3.1 Threat Model
We characterize our threat model with respsect to an attacker’s capability, background knowl-
edge, and goals.
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Attacker’s capability and background knowledge: We assume an attacker can inject
some fake users into an LDP protocol. These fake users can send arbitrary data in the encoded
space to the central server. Specifically, we assume n genuine users and the attacker injects m
fake users to the system. Therefore, the total number of users becomes n+m. We note that
it is a practical threat model to assume that an attacker can inject fake users. For instance,
around 5% of Facebook’s monthly active users are fake [3], and 9% to 15% of active Twitter
users are fake [55].
Since an LDP protocol executes the encode and perturb steps locally on each user’s device,
the attacker has access to the implementation of the encode and perturb steps. Therefore, the
attacker knows various parameters of the LDP protocol. In particular, the attacker knows the
domain size d, the encoded space D, and the support set S(y) for each perturbed value y ∈ D.
Attacker’s goal: We consider the attacker’s goal is to promote some target items, i.e., in-
crease the estimated frequencies of the target items. For example, a company may be interested
in making its products more popular. Formally, we denote by T = {t1, t2, · · · , tr} the set of r
target items. To increase the estimated frequencies of the target items, the attacker carefully
crafts the perturbed values sent from the fake users to the central server. We denote by Y
the set of crafted perturbed values for the fake users, where an entry yi of Y is the crafted
perturbed value for a fake user. The perturbed value yi could be a number (e.g., for kRR
protocol), a binary vector (e.g., for OUE), and a tuple (e.g., for OLH).
Suppose f˜t,b and f˜t,a are the frequencies estimated by the LDP protocol for a target item t
before and after attack, respectively. We define the frequency gain ∆f˜t for a target item t as
follows:
∆f˜t = f˜t,a − f˜t,b,∀t ∈ T. (17)
A larger frequency gain ∆f˜t implies a more successful attack. Note that an LDP protocol
perturbs the value on each genuine user randomly. Therefore, the frequency gain ∆f˜t is
random for a given set of crafted perturbed values Y for the fake users. Thus, we define the
attacker’s overall gain G using the sum of the expected frequency gains for the target items:
G(Y) =
∑
t∈T
E[∆f˜t]. (18)
Therefore, an attacker’s goal is to craft the perturbed values Y to maximize the overall gain.
Formally, the attacker aims to solve the following optimization problem:
max
Y
G(Y). (19)
We note that, to incorporate the different priorities of the target items, an attacker could
also assign different weights to the expected frequency gains E[∆f˜t] of different target items
when calculating the overall gain. Our attacks are also applicable to such scenarios. However,
for simplicity, we assume the target items have the same priority.
3.2 Three Attacks
We propose three attacks: Random perturbed-value attack (RPA), random item attack (RIA),
and Maximal gain attack (MGA). RPA selects a perturbed value from the encoded space of
the LDP protocol uniformly at random for each fake user and sends it to the server. RPA does
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not consider any information about the target items. RIA selects a target item from the set of
target items uniformly at random for each fake user and uses the LDP protocol to encode and
perturb the item. MGA crafts the perturbed value for each fake user to maximize the overall
gain G via solving the optimization problem in Equation (19). RPA and RIA are two baseline
attacks, which are designed to better demonstrate the effectiveness of MGA.
Random perturbed-value attack (RPA): For each fake user, RPA selects a value from
the encoded space of the LDP protocol uniformly at random and sends it to the server.
Random item attack (RIA): Unlike RPA, RIA considers information about the target
items. In particular, RIA randomly selects a target item from the set of target items for each
fake user. Then, the LDP protocol is applied to encode and perturb the item. Finally, the
perturbed value is sent to the server.
Maximal gain attack (MGA): The idea behind this attack is to craft the perturbed values
for the fake users via solving the optimization problem in Equation (19). Specifically, according
to Equation (3), the frequency gain ∆f˜t for a target item t is as follows:
∆f˜t =
1
n+m
n+m∑
i=1
1S(yi)(t)− q
p− q −
1
n
n∑
i=1
1S(yi)(t)− q
p− q (20)
=
n+m∑
i=n+1
1S(yi)(t)
(n+m)(p− q) −
m
n∑
i=1
1S(yi)(t)
n(n+m)(p− q) , (21)
where yi is the perturbed value sent from user i to the server. The first term in Equation (21)
only depends on fake users, while the second term only depends on genuine users. Moreover,
the expected frequency gain for a target item t is as follows:
E[∆f˜t] =
n+m∑
i=n+1
E[1S(yi)(t)]
(n+m)(p− q) −
m
n∑
i=1
E[1S(yi)(t)]
n(n+m)(p− q) , (22)
where we denote the second term as a constant ct for simplicity. Moreover, based on Equation
(5), we have:
ct =
m(ft(p− q) + q)
(n+m)(p− q) , (23)
where ft is the true frequency of the target item t among the n genuine users. Furthermore,
we have the overall gain as follows:
G =
n+m∑
i=n+1
∑
t∈T
E[1S(yi)(t)]
(n+m)(p− q) − c, (24)
where c =
∑
t∈T ct =
m(fT (p−q)+rq)
(n+m)(p−q) , where fT =
∑
t∈T ft. c does not depend on the perturbed
values sent from the fake users to the central server. In RPA and RIA, the crafted perturbed
values for the fake users are random. Therefore, the expectation of the identity functions
E[1S(yi)(t)] and thus the overall gain depend on such randomness. However, MGA uses the
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optimal perturbed values for fake users, and the identity function 1S(yi)(t) becomes determin-
istic. Therefore, for MGA, we can drop the expectation E in Equation (24), and then we can
transform the optimization problem in Equation (19) as follows:
Y∗ = arg max
Y
G(Y) (25)
= arg max
Y
n+m∑
i=n+1
∑
t∈T
1S(yi)(t), (26)
where we remove the constants c and (n+m)(p− q) in the optimization problem. Note that
the above optimization problem only depends on the perturbed values of the fake users, and
the perturbed values yi for the fake users are independent from each other. Therefore, we can
solve the optimization problem independently for each fake user. Formally, for each fake user,
we craft its perturbed value y∗ via solving the following optimization problem:
y∗ = arg max
y∈D
∑
t∈T
1S(y)(t). (27)
We note that, for each fake user, we obtain its perturbed value via solving the same above
optimization problem. However, as we will show in the next sections, the optimization problem
has many optimal solutions. Therefore, we randomly pick an optimal solution for a fake user.
Next, we discuss how to apply these three attacks to state-of-the-art LDP protocols includ-
ing kRR, OUE, and OLH, as well as analyzing their overall gains.
3.3 Attacking kRR
Random perturbed-value attack (RPA): For each fake user, RPA randomly selects a
perturbed value yi from the encoded space, i.e., [d], and sends it to the server. We can
calculate the expectation of the identity function for a target item t ∈ T as follows:
E[1S(yi)(t)] = Pr(1S(yi)(t) = 1) (28)
= Pr(t ∈ S(yi)) (29)
= Pr(yi = t) (30)
=
1
d
(31)
Therefore, according to Equation (24), the overall gain is:
G =
rm
d(n+m)(p− q) − c. (32)
Random item attack (RIA): For each fake user, RIA randomly selects an item ti from
the set of target items T , perturbs the item following the rule in Equation (7), and sends
the perturbed item yi to the server. Next, we derive the overall gain for RIA. First, we can
calculate the expectation of the identity function as follows:
E[1S(yi)(t)] = Pr(yi = t) (33)
= Pr(ti = t)Pr(yi = t|ti = t)
+ Pr(ti 6= t)Pr(yi = t|ti 6= t) (34)
=
1
r
· p+ (1− 1
r
)q, (35)
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where r = |T | is the number of target items. According to Equation (24), we can obtain the
overall gain as follows:
G =
(p+ (r − 1)q)m
(n+m)(p− q) − c. (36)
Maximal gain attack (MGA): For each fake user, MGA crafts its perturbed value by solv-
ing the optimization problem in Equation (27). For the kRR protocol, we have
∑
t∈T 1S(y)(t) ≤
1 and
∑
t∈T 1S(y)(t) = 1 when y is a target item in T . Therefore, MGA picks any target item
for each fake user. Moreover, according to Equation (24), the overall gain is as follows:
G =
m
(n+m)(p− q) − c. (37)
3.4 Attacking OUE
Random perturbed-value attack (RPA): For each fake user, RPA selects a d-bits binary
vector yi from the encoded space {0, 1}d uniformly at random as its perturbed vector and
sends it to the server. We denote by yi,j the j-th bit of the perturbed vector yi. Therefore,
for each target item t ∈ T , we have:
E[1S(yi)(t)] = Pr(yi,t = 1) =
1
2
(38)
According to Equation (24), we can obtain the overall gain as follows:
G =
rm
2(n+m)(p− q) − c. (39)
Random item attack (RIA): For each fake user, RIA randomly selects a target item ti ∈ T ,
encodes it to a d-bits binary vector ei whose bits are all zeros except the ti-th bit, randomly
perturbs ei following Equation (10), and sends the perturbed vector yi to the server. For a
target item t ∈ T , we can calculate the expected value of the identity function as follows:
E[1S(yi)(t)] = Pr(yi,t = 1) (40)
= Pr(ti = t)Pr(yi,t = 1|ti = t)
+ Pr(ti 6= t)Pr(yi,t = 1|ti 6= t) (41)
=
1
r
· p+ (1− 1
r
) · q, (42)
where p and q are defined in Equation (10). Therefore, the overall gain is as follows:
G =
(p+ (r − 1)q)m
(n+m)(p− q) − c. (43)
Maximal gain attack (MGA): For each fake user, MGA chooses a perturbed vector yi
that is a solution of the optimization problem defined in Equation (27). For OUE, we have∑
t∈T 1S(yi)(t) ≤ r and
∑
t∈T 1S(yi)(t) = r is achieved when:
1S(yi)(t) = 1,∀t ∈ T. (44)
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Thus, for each fake user, MGA initializes a perturbed vector yi as a binary vector of all
0’s and sets yi,t = 1 for all t ∈ T . However, if all fake users send the same perturbed binary
vector to the server, the server can easily detect the fake users. Therefore, MGA also randomly
samples l non-target bits of the perturbed vector yi and sets them to 1. Specifically, we set l
such that the number of 1’s in the binary vector is the expected number of 1’s in the perturbed
binary vector of a genuine user. Since the perturbed binary vector of a genuine user has
p+ (d− 1)q 1’s on average, we set l = bp+ (d− 1)q − rc. Note that r is usually much smaller
than d, so l is a non-negative value. The final binary vector is sent to the server. According
to Equation (24), the overall gain is as follows:
G =
rm
(n+m)(p− q) − c. (45)
3.5 Attacking OLH
Random perturbed-value attack (RPA): For each fake user, RPA randomly selects a
hash function Hi ∈ H and a hash value ai ∈ [d′], and sends the tuple yi = (Hi, ai) to the
server. For each t ∈ T , we have:
E[1S(yi)(t)] = Pr(Hi(t) = ai) =
1
d′
. (46)
Therefore, we can obtain the overall gain as follows:
G =
rm
d′(n+m)(p− q) − c. (47)
Random item attack (RIA): For each fake user, RIA randomly selects a target item ti,
randomly selects a hash function Hi ∈ H, and calculates the hash value hi = Hi(ti). The tuple
(Hi, hi) is then perturbed as (Hi, ai) according to Equation (13). (Hi, ai) is the perturbed
value, i.e., yi = (Hi, ai). We assume the hash function Hi maps any item in [d] to a value in
[d′] uniformly at random. For a target item t ∈ T , we can calculate the expectation of the
identity function as follows:
E[1S(yi)(t)] = Pr(Hi(t) = ai) (48)
= Pr(ti = t)Pr(Hi(t) = ai|ti = t)
+ Pr(ti 6= t)Pr(Hi(t) = ai|ti 6= t), (49)
where
Pr(Hi(t) = ai|ti 6= t)
= Pr(Hi(t) = hi)Pr(Hi(t) = ai|ti 6= t,Hi(t) = hi)
+ Pr(Hi(t) 6= hi)Pr(Hi(t) = ai|ti 6= t,Hi(t) 6= hi) (50)
=
1
d′
· p′ + (1− 1
d′
) · q′. (51)
Therefore, we have:
E[1S(yi)(t)] =
1
r
· p′ + (1− 1
r
)(
1
d′
· p′ + (1− 1
d′
) · q′) (52)
= p′
[
1
r
+ (1− 1
r
) · 1
d′
]
+ q′(1− 1
r
)(1− 1
d′
) (53)
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kRR OUE OLH
Random perturbed-value attack (RPA) β( rd − fT ) β(r − fT ) −βfT
Random item attack (RIA) β(1− fT ) β(1− fT ) β(1− fT )
Maximal gain attack (MGA) β(1− fT ) + β(d−r)e−1 β(2r − fT ) + 2βre−1 β(2r − fT ) + 2βre−1
Table 1: Overall gains of the three attacks for kRR, OUE, and OLH. β = mn+m
is the fraction of fake users among all users, d is the number of items, r is the
number of target items, fT =
∑
t∈T ft is the sum of true frequencies of the target
items among the genuine users,  is the privacy budget, and e is the base of the
natural logarithm.
Thus, the overall gain for RIA is:
G =
r
[
p′
(
1
r + (1− 1r ) · 1d′
)
+ q′(1− 1r )(1− 1d′ )
]
m
(n+m)(p− q) − c (54)
=
[p′ + (r − 1)q′]m
(n+m)(p− q) +
m(r − 1)(p′ − q′)
d′(n+m)(p− q) − c. (55)
Maximal gain attack (MGA): For each fake user, MGA chooses a perturbed value yi =
(Hi, ai) that is a solution of the optimization problem defined in Equation (27). For OLH, we
have
∑
t∈T 1S(yi)(t) ≤ r and
∑
t∈T 1S(yi)(t) = r is achieved when:
Hi(t) = ai, ∀t ∈ T. (56)
Thus, for each fake user, MGA searches for a hash function Hi in H such that Equation
(56) holds. Therefore, according to Equation (24), the overall gain is as follows:
G =
rm
(n+m)(p− q) − c. (57)
Note that we may not be able to find such a hash function in practice. In our experiments,
for each fake user, we randomly sample 1,000 hash functions and use the one that achieves the
largest
∑
t∈T 1S(yi)(t).
3.6 Theoretical Analysis
Table 1 summarizes the overall gains of the three attacks for kRR, OUE, and OLH, where we
have replaced the parameters p and q for each LDP protocol according to Section 2.1. Next,
we compare the three attacks, discuss a fundamental security-privacy tradeoff, and compare
the three LDP protocols with respect to their security against our data poisoning attacks.
Comparing the three attacks: All the three attacks achieve larger overall gains when the
target items’ true frequencies are smaller (i.e., fT is smaller). MGA achieves the largest overall
gain among the three attacks. In fact, given an LDP protocol, a set of target items, and a set
of fake users, MGA achieves the largest overall gain among all possible attacks. In other words,
no matter what perturbed values the fake users send to the server, the overall gain cannot be
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larger than that achieved by MGA. This is because MGA crafts the perturbed values for the
fake users such that the overall gain is maximized. RIA achieves larger overall gains than RPA
for kRR and OLH protocols, while RPA achieves larger overall gains than RIA for OUE.
Fundamental security-privacy tradeoffs: The security of an LDP protocol against data
poisoning attacks is determined by the strongest attack to it. The following theorem shows
that, when the strongest attack MGA is used, there is a fundamental tradeoff between privacy
and security of an LDP protocol.
Theorem 1 (Security-Privacy Tradeoff). For any of the three LDP protocols kRR, OUE, and
OLH, when the privacy budget  is smaller (i.e., stronger privacy), MGA achieves a larger
overall gain G (i.e., weaker security).
Proof. Table 1 shows that  is in the denominator of the overall gains for MGA. Therefore,
the overall gains of MGA increase as  decreases.
Comparing the security of the three LDP protocols: Our overall gains in Table 1 show
that, when MGA is used, OUE and OLH achieve the same overall gain. Therefore, OUE and
OLH have the same level of security against data poisoning attacks. The following theorem
shows that OUE and OLH are more secure than kRR when the number of items is larger than
a threshold.
Theorem 2. Suppose MGA is used. OUE and OLH are more secure than kRR when the
following condition is satisfied:
d > (2r − 1)(e − 1) + 3r. (58)
Proof. Let β(1− fT ) + β(d−r)e−1 > β(2r − fT ) + 2βre−1 , we have:
1 +
d− r
e − 1 > 2r +
2r
e − 1 (59)
⇐⇒ d− 3r
e − 1 > 2r − 1. (60)
Since e > 1, the inequality above is equivalent to:
d > (2r − 1)(e − 1) + 3r. (61)
4 Attacking Heavy Hitter Identification
4.1 Threat model
Attacker’s capability and background knowledge: We make the same assumption of the
attacker’s capability and background knowledge as in attacking frequency estimation, i.e., the
attacker can inject fake users into the protocol and send arbitrary data to the central server.
Attacker’s goal: We consider the attacker’s goal is to promote some target items, i.e.,
manipulate the heavy hitter identification protocol to recognize the target items as top-k
heavy hitters. Formally, we denote by T = {t1, t2, · · · , tr} the set of r target items, which are
not among the true top-k heavy hitters. We define success rate of an attack as the fraction of
target items that are promoted to be top-k heavy hitters by the attack. An attacker’s goal is
to achieve a high success rate.
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Parameter Default setting
β 0.05
r 1
fT 0.01
 1
k 20
g 10
Table 2: Default parameter settings.
4.2 Attacks
State-of-the-art heavy hitter identification protocols iteratively apply frequency estimation
protocols. Therefore, we apply the three attacks for frequency estimation to heavy hitter
identification. Next, we use PEM as an example to illustrate how to attack heavy hitter
identification protocols.
In PEM, each item is encoded by a γ-bits binary vector and users are randomly divided into
g groups. On average, each group contains a fraction of mn+m fake users. In the jth iteration,
PEM uses OLH to perturb the first λj bits of the binary vectors for users in the jth group and
send them to the central server. An attacker uses the RPA, RIA, or MGA to craft the data
sent from the fake users to the central server by treating the first λj bits of the binary vectors
corresponding to the target items as the “target items” in the jth iteration. Such attacks
can increase the likelihood that the first λj bits of the target items are identified as the top-k
prefixes in the jth iteration, which in turn makes it more likely to promote the target items as
top-k heavy hitters.
5 Evaluation
5.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets: We evaluate our attacks on three datasets, including a synthetic dataset and two
real-world datasets, i.e., Fire [5] and IPUMS [52].
• Zipf: Following previous work on LDP protocols, we generate random data following the
Zipf’s distribution. In particular, we use the same parameter in the Zipf’s distribution
as in [64]. By default, we synthesize a dataset with 1,024 items and 1,000,000 users.
• Fire [5]: The Fire dataset was collected by the San Francisco Fire Department, recording
information about calls for service. We filter the records by call type and use the data
of type “Alarms”. We treat the unit ID as the item that each user holds, which results
in a total of 244 items and 548,868 users.
• IPUMS [52]: The IPUMS dataset contains the US census data in different years. We
select the latest data in year 2017 and treat the city attribute as the item each user holds,
which results in a total of 102 items and 389,894 users.
Parameter setting: For frequency estimation, the overall gains of our attacks may depend on
β (the fraction of fake users), r and fT (the number of target items and their true frequencies),
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Figure 1: Impact of different parameters on the overall gains of the three attacks
for kRR.
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Figure 2: Impact of different parameters on the overall gains of the three attacks
for OUE.
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Figure 3: Impact of different parameters on the overall gains of the three attacks
for OLH.
 (privacy budget), and d (number of items in the domain). For heavy hitter identification,
the success rates of our attacks further depend on k (the number of items identified as heavy
hitters) and g (the group size used by the PEM protocol). Table 2 shows the default settings
for these parameters, which we will use in our experiments unless otherwise mentioned. We
will study the impact of each parameter, while fixing the remaining parameters to their default
settings. Moreover, we use d′ = de + 1e in OLH as d′ is an integer.
5.2 Results for Frequency Estimation
Impact of different parameters: Table 1 shows the theoretical overall gains of the three
attacks for the kRR, OUE, and OLH protocols. We use these theoretical results to study
the impact of each parameter. Figures 1 to 3 show the impact of different parameters on the
overall gains. We observe that MGA outperforms RIA, which outperforms RPA or achieves
similar overall gains with RPA. The reason is that MGA is an optimization-based attack,
RIA considers information of the target items, and RPA does not consider information about
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Figure 4: Theoretical and practical overall gains of RIA for OLH.
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Figure 5: Theoretical and practical overall gains of MGA for OLH on the three
datasets as we sample more hash functions for each fake user, where r = 5.
the target items. Next, we focus our analysis on MGA since it is the strongest attack. The
overall gains of MGA increase as the attacker injects more fake users, the attacker promotes
more target items (except the kRR protocol), or the privacy budget  becomes smaller (i.e.,
security-privacy tradeoffs). The true frequencies of the target items (i.e., fT ) have little impact
on the overall gains of MGA, though they theoretically decrease as fT increases. The overall
gain of MGA increases for kRR but keeps unchanged for OUE and OLH as d increases. When
d is larger than a threshold, kRR is less secure than OUE and OLH against MGA.
Measuring RIA and MGA for OLH: The theoretical overall gain of RIA for OLH is
derived based on the “perfect” hashing assumption, i.e., an item is hashed to a value in the hash
domain [d′] uniformly at random. Practical hash functions may not satisfy this assumption.
Therefore, the theoretical overall gain of RIA for OLH may be inaccurate in practice. We use
xxhash [16] as hash functions to evaluate the gaps between the theoretical and practical overall
gains. In particular, Figure 4 compares the theoretical and practical overall gains of RIA for
OLH, where 1 randomly selected item is treated as target item, β = 0.05, and  = 1. We
observe that the theoretical and practical overall gains of RIA for OLH are similar.
Our theoretical overall gain of MGA for OLH is derived based on the assumption that the
attacker can find a hash function that hashes all target items to the same value. In practice, we
may not be able to find such hash functions within a given amount of time. Therefore, for each
fake user, we randomly sample some xxhash hash functions and use the one that hashes the
most target items to the same value. Figure 5 compares the theoretical and practical overall
gains of MGA for OLH on the three datasets as we sample more hash functions for each fake
user, where we randomly select 5 items as target items, i.e., r = 5. We do not use our default
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Figure 6: Impact of different parameters on the success rates of the three attacks
for PEM on the Zipf dataset.
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Figure 7: Impact of different parameters on the success rates of the three attacks
for PEM on the Fire dataset.
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Figure 8: Impact of different parameters on the success rates of the three attacks
for PEM on the IPUMS dataset.
setting of r = 1 because when there is only one target item, any hash function can hash all
target items to the same value. Our results show that several hundreds of randomly sampled
hash functions are enough to make the practical overall gains approach the theoretical ones.
5.3 Results for Heavy Hitter Identification
Figures 6, 7, and 8 show the empirical results of applying our three attacks, i.e., RPA, RIA and
MGA, to PEM on the Zipf, Fire, and IPUMS datasets, respectively. By default, we randomly
select r = 10 target items that are not identified as top-k heavy hitters by PEM before attack
and use the three attacks to promote them. Default values for the other parameters are identical
to those in Table 2. The success rate of an attack is calculated as the fraction of target items
that appear in the estimated top-k heavy hitters. The results show that our MGA attacks
can effectively compromise the PEM protocol. In particular, we observe that MGA only needs
about 5% of fake users to achieve a 100% success rate when r = 10 and k = 20. In fact, with
only 5% fake users, we are able to promote all 10 target items to be in the top-15 heavy hitters,
or promote all 15 target items to be in the top-20 heavy hitters. However, RPA and RIA are
ineffective. Specifically, even if we inject 10% fake users, neither RPA nor RIA can successfully
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promote even one of the target items to be in the top-k heavy hitters. Moreover, the number
of groups g and the privacy budget  have negligible impact on the effectiveness of our attacks.
6 Countermeasures
We explore two countermeasures. The first countermeasure is to normalize the estimated
item frequencies to be a probability distribution, while the second countermeasure is to detect
fake users via statistical analysis of the perturbed values and remove the detected fake users
before estimating item frequencies. The two countermeasures can reduce the overall gains of
our attacks in some scenarios. However, our attack MGA is still effective in other scenarios,
highlighting the needs for new defenses against our data poisoning attacks.
6.1 Normalization
The LDP protocols estimate item frequencies using Equation (3). Therefore, the estimated
item frequencies may not form a probability distribution, i.e., some estimated item frequencies
may be negative and they may not sum to 1. For instance, our experimental results in Sec-
tion 5.2 show that the overall gains of MGA may be even larger than 1. Therefore, one natural
countermeasure is to normalize the estimated item frequencies such that each estimated item
frequency is non-negative and the estimated item frequencies sum to 1. Specifically, the central
server first estimates the frequency f˜v for each item v following a LDP protocol (kRR, OUE, or
OLH); then the server finds the minimal estimated item frequency f˜min; finally, the server cal-
ibrates the estimated frequency for each item v as f¯v =
f˜v−f˜min∑
v(f˜v−f˜min)
, where f¯v is the calibrated
frequency. Our overall gain is calculated by the difference between the calibrated frequencies
of the target items after and before attack. Note that the normalization countermeasure is not
applicable to heavy hitter identification because normalization does not impact the ranking of
items’ frequencies.
6.2 Detecting Fake Users
RPA and MGA directly craft the perturbed values for fake users, instead of using the LDP
protocol to generate the perturbed values from certain items. Therefore, the perturbed values
for the fake users may be statistically abnormal. We note that it is challenging to detect
fake users via statistical analysis of the perturbed values for the kRR protocol, because the
perturbed value of a user is just an item, no matter whether or not the attacker follows the
protocol to generate the perturbed value. Therefore, we study detecting fake users in the RPA
and MGA attacks for the OUE and OLH protocols. Since PEM iteratively applies OLH, we
can also apply the countermeasure of detecting fake users to PEM.
OUE: Recall that MGA assigns 1 to all target items and l randomly selected items in the
perturbed binary vector for each fake user. Therefore, among the perturbed binary vectors
from the fake users, a set of items will always be 1. However, if the perturbed binary vectors
follow the OUE protocol, it is unlikely to observe that this set of items are all 1 for a large
number of users. Therefore, our idea to detect fake users consists of two steps. In the first
step, the server identifies item sets that are all 1 in the perturbed binary vectors of a large
number of users. In the second step, the server detects fake users if the probability that such
large number of users have these item sets of all 1 is very small, when following OUE.
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User 1:
User 2:
User 3:
User 4:
Figure 9: An example item set that are all 1’s in 3 of the 4 binary vectors. Each
column corresponds to an item.
Step I. In this step, the server identifies item sets that are frequently all 1’s among the
perturbed binary vectors from the users. Figure 9 shows an example item set that are all
1’s in 3 of the 4 binary vectors. Identifying such item sets is also known as frequent itemset
mining [7]. In our problem, given the perturbed binary vectors from all users, frequent itemset
mining can find the item sets that are all 1’s in at least a certain number of users. Specifically,
a frequent itemset mining method produces some tuples B = {(B, s)|s ≥ τ}, where B is an
item set and s is the number of users whose perturbed binary vectors are 1 for all items in
B. In our experiments, we use the popular frequent itemset mining method called FP-growth
[28].
Step II. In this step, we determine whether there are frequent item sets that are statistically
abnormal. Specifically, we predict a tuple (B, s) ∈ B to be abnormal if s ≥ τz, where z = |B|
is the size of the item set B. When an item set is predicted to be abnormal, we predict the
users whose perturbed binary vectors are 1’s for all items in the item set to be fake. The
threshold τz achieves a tradeoff between false positive rate and false negative rate of detecting
fake users. Specifically, when τz is larger, a smaller number of genuine users are predicted as
fake (i.e., a smaller false positive rate), while a larger number of fake users are not detected
(i.e., a larger false negative rate). Therefore, a key challenge is how to select the threshold τz.
We propose to select the threshold such that the false positive rate is at most η. Specifically,
given a threshold τz > (n+m)pq
z−1, we can derive an upper bound of the false positive rate
as (n+m)pq
z−1(1−pqz−1)
[τz−(n+m)pqz−1]2 (see Appendix A.1 for details). Therefore, to guarantee that the false
positive rate is at most η and achieve a small false negative rate, we select the smallest τz that
satisfies τz > (n+m)pq
z−1 and (n+m)pq
z−1(1−pqz−1)
[τz−(n+m)pqz−1]2 ≤ η.
OLH: To attack the OLH protocol, MGA searches a hash function for each fake user that
hashes as many target items to the same value as possible. Suppose we construct a d-bit binary
vector y for each user with a tuple (H, a) such that yv = 1 if and only if H(v) = a. Then,
the target items will be 1 in the binary vectors for a large number of users. Therefore, we
can leverage the method to detect fake users in OUE to OLH. Specifically, in Step I, we use
FP-growth to find frequent item sets in the constructed binary vectors. In Step II, we predict
an item set B to be abnormal if its number of occurrences s among the n+m binary vectors
is larger than a threshold τz, where z = |B| is the size of the item set. Like OUE, we select the
threshold τz such that the false positive rate is at most η. Specifically, we select the smallest
τz that satisfies the following condition:
I(qz−1; τz, n+m− τz + 1) ≤ η, (62)
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kRR OUE OLH
No Norm Detect Both No Norm Detect Both No Norm Detect Both
RPA 3e-4 2e-4 – – 0.05 2e-4 0.00/1.00/0.05 2e-4 -1e-4 -4e-4 0.00/1.00/-1e-4 -4e-4
RIA 0.05 0.02 – – 0.05 0.03 – – 0.05 0.03 – –
MGA 2.99 0.47 – – 0.16 0.09 0.00/1.00/0.16 0.09 0.17 0.10 0.00/1.00/0.17 0.10
(a) r = 1
kRR OUE OLH
No Norm Detect Both No Norm Detect Both No Norm Detect Both
RPA 2e-3 7e-4 – – 0.25 -3e-4 0.00/1.00/0.25 -3e-4 -7e-4 -3e-4 0.00/1.00/-7e-4 -3e-4
RIA 0.05 0.01 – – 0.05 0.03 – – 0.05 0.03 – –
MGA 2.87 0.45 – – 0.79 0.32 0.00/0.00/-0.02 -0.01 0.83 0.37 0.00/0.00/-0.01 -0.01
(b) r = 5
kRR OUE OLH
No Norm Detect Both No Norm Detect Both No Norm Detect Both
RPA 2e-3 -1e-3 – – 0.50 2e-3 0.00/1.00/0.50 2e-3 -2e-3 -2e-3 0.00/1.00/-2e-3 -2e-3
RIA 0.05 -4e-3 – – 0.05 0.03 – – 0.05 0.03 – –
MGA 2.72 0.43 – – 1.58 0.46 0.00/0.00/7e-17 -2e-16 1.18 0.43 0.00/1.00/1.18 0.43
(c) r = 10
Table 3: Overall gains of the three attacks on the IPUMS dataset for different
countermeasures. The column “No” means no countermeasure is used. The col-
umn “Both” means the combined countermeasure. The column “Detect” shows
the false positive rate (FPR) of detecting fake users, false negative rate (FNR) of
detecting fake users, and overall gain of the attack in the form of “FPR / FNR /
Overall Gain”. “–” means that the countermeasure is not applicable.
where I is the regularized incomplete beta function [6]. I(qz−1; τz, n+m− τz + 1) is the false
positive rate for a given τz (see Appendix A.2 for details).
PEM: The heavy hitter identification protocol PEM iteratively applies OLH to identify heavy
hitters. Therefore, we can apply the detection method to detect fake users in PEM. Specifically,
in each iteration of PEM, we apply the method of detecting fake users in OLH to detect fake
users in PEM; and the central server removes the predicted fake users before computing the
top-k prefixes.
6.3 Experimental Results
We empirically evaluate the effectiveness of the two countermeasures. Note that the two
countermeasures can also be used together. Specifically, the central server can first detect
fake users, remove the detected fake users, and then use normalization. Therefore, we will
also evaluate the combined countermeasure. We use the same default experimental setup as
those in Section 5.1. For detecting fake users, we use the FP-growth algorithm implemented
in the Python package mlxtend [47] to identify frequent item sets. We set η = 0.01 in our
experiments, i.e., we allow a false positive rate of at most 0.01.
Frequency estimation: Table 3 shows the experimental results with no countermeasure,
normalization, detection, and combined countermeasure, where the number of target items r
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r=1 r=5 r=10
No 1.00 1.00 1.00
Detect 1.00 0.00 1.00
Table 4: Success rates of MGA to PEM on the IPUMS dataset for no counter-
measures and detecting fake users.
is 1, 5, and 10, respectively.
We observe that the countermeasures are effective in some scenarios. For example, for
OUE and r = 10, combining the two countermeasures leads to an overall gain of -2e-16 for
MGA, which means that the estimated frequency of the target items is even smaller than
the one before attack. However, the countermeasures are ineffective in other scenarios. For
instance, when r = 10, MGA can still achieve a large overall gain of 0.43 for OLH even if both
countermeasures are used. Moreover, when r = 1, detecting fake users is not effective for OUE
and OLH at all, with false negative rates of 1.0. This is because the perturbed binary vectors
from the fake users do not have abnormal frequent item sets when the number of target items
is small. As a result, after normalization, MGA to OUE and OLH can still achieve overall
gains of 0.09 and 0.10, respectively. Our results show that new defense mechanisms are needed
to defend against our data poisoning attacks.
Normalization can reduce the overall gains of all the three attacks for the three protocols
except RPA for OLH, where the overall gain is negative anyway. Detecting fake users is
ineffective for RPA because RPA randomly samples perturbed values in the encoded space
for the fake users and thus the perturbed values do not have meaningful statistical patterns.
Detecting fake users is effective for MGA to OUE when the number of target items is large,
because a large number of target items make the perturbed binary vectors for the fake users
in MGA statistically abnormal. Detecting fake users is ineffective for MGA to OLH when the
number of target items is too large (e.g., r = 10). This is because, for each fake user, we search
1,000 random hash functions and select the one that hashes the most target items to the same
value. On average, the selected hash function hashes 7.85 target items to the same value for a
fake user. As a result, the statistical patterns of the perturbed values for the fake users become
undetectable to the detection method.
When the countermeasures are used, MGA is still the most effective attack in most cases.
However, in the cases where detecting fake users is effective, RIA achieves larger overall gains
than MGA. For instance, for OUE and r = 5, RIA achieves an overall gain of 0.03 after
normalization, while MGA achieves an overall gain of -0.01 after detecting fake users and
normalization.
Heavy hitter identification: Normalization is ineffective for heavy hitter identification be-
cause normalization does not impact the ranking of the items’ estimated frequencies. Therefore,
we only perform experiments on detecting fake users for heavy hitter identification. Moreover,
we focus on MGA because RIA and RPA are ineffective even without detecting fake users (see
Figures 6, 7, and 8).
Table 4 shows the success rates of MGA to the PEM protocol when there is no countermea-
sure or when detecting fake users is used. We vary the number of target items as r = 1, 5, 10
and use the default settings for the other parameters. We observe that detecting fake users is
effective in some scenarios but not in others. For instance, when r = 5, detecting fake users
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can reduce the success rate of MGA from 1 to 0, as all fake users can be detected. However,
when r = 1 or r = 10, our MGA can still achieve a success rate of 1, highlighting the needs for
new defenses against our data poisoning attacks to heavy hitter identification protocols.
6.4 Other Countermeasures
Detecting fake users is related to Sybil detection in distributed systems and social networks.
Many methods have been proposed to mitigate Sybil attacks. For instance, methods [53, 76,
75, 18, 13, 71, 26, 59, 56, 73, 35, 51, 61, 14, 38, 32, 25, 58, 60] that leverage content, behavior,
and social graphs have been developed to detect fake users in social networks. Our detection
method can be viewed as a content-based method. Specifically, our detection method analyzes
the statistical patterns of the user-generated content (i.e., perturbed values sent to the central
server) to detect fake users. However, our detection method is different from the content-
based methods to detect fake users in social networks, because the user-generated content and
their statistical patterns are different. Social-graph-based methods are not applicable when
the social graphs are not available.
Another countermeasure is to leverage Proof-of-Work [22], similar to how Sybil is mitigated
in Bitcoin. In particular, before a user is allowed to participate the LDP protocol, the central
server sends a random string to the user; and the user is allowed to participate the LDP protocol
after the user finds a string such that the cryptographic hash value of the concatenated string
has a certain property, e.g., the first 32 bits are all 0. However, such method incurs a large
computational cost for genuine users, which impacts user experience. Moreover, when users
use mobile devices such as phones and IoT devices, it is challenging for them to perform the
Proof-of-Work.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we perform the first systematic study on data poisoning attacks to LDP protocols.
Our results show that an attacker can inject fake users to an LDP protocol and send carefully
crafted data to the server such that the target items are estimated to have high frequencies
or promoted to be identified as heavy hitters. We show that we can formulate such attacks
as optimization problem, solving which an attacker can maximize its attack effectiveness. We
theoretically and/or empirically show the effectiveness of our attacks. Moreover, we explore two
countermeasures against our attacks. Our empirical results show that these countermeasures
have limited effectiveness in some scenarios, highlighting the needs for new defenses against
our attacks.
Interesting future work includes generalizing our attacks to other LDP protocols, e.g., LDP
protocols for item set mining [66] and key-value pairs [74], and developing new defenses to
mitigate our attacks.
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A False Positive Rates of Detecting Fake Users
We derive the upper bounds of false positive rates of detecting fake users.
A.1 OUE
If a user’s perturbed binary vector y follows the OUE protocol, then we can calculate the
probability that the items in a set B of size z, are all 1 in the perturbed binary vector as
28
follows:
Pr(yb = 1,∀b ∈ B) =
{
pqz−1, if v ∈ B,
qz, otherwise,
(63)
where yb is the bth bit of the perturbed binary vector y and v is the user’s item. Let fB =∑
b∈B fb denote the sum of true frequencies of all items in B, X1 denote the random variable
representing the number of users whose items are in B and whose perturbed binary vectors
are 1 for all items in B, and X2 denote the random variable representing the number of users
whose items are not in B and whose perturbed binary vectors are 1 for all items in B. If all
the n+m users follow the OUE protocol, then we have the following distributions:
X1 ∼ Binom(fB(n+m), pqz−1)
X2 ∼ Binom((1− fB)(n+m), qz),
(64)
where Binom is a binomial distribution. Now we consider another random variable X =
X1 + X2, which represents the number of users whose perturbed binary vectors are 1 for all
items in B. X follows a distribution with mean µ and variance V ar as follows:
µ = fB(n+m)pq
z−1 + (1− fB)(n+m)qz (65)
≤ (n+m)pqz−1 (66)
V ar = fB(n+m)pq
z−1(1− pqz−1)
+ (1− fB)(n+m)qz(1− qz) (67)
≤ (n+m)pqz−1(1− pqz−1). (68)
Based on the Chebyshev’s inequality, for any τz > (n+m)pq
z−1, we have:
Pr(X ≥ τz) = Pr(X − µ ≥ τz − µ)
≤ Pr(|X − µ| ≥ τz − µ)
≤ V ar
(τz − µ)2
≤ (n+m)pq
z−1(1− pqz−1)
[τz − (n+m)pqz−1]2 (69)
Here, if we choose τz as the threshold, the probability Pr(X ≥ τz) is the false positive rate,
which is upper bounded by (n+m)pq
z−1(1−pqz−1)
[τz−(n+m)pqz−1]2 .
A.2 OLH
As discussed in Section 6.2, we first construct a d-bit binary vector y for each user with a tuple
(H, a) such that yv = 1 if and only if H(v) = a. For an item set B of size z, assume X is a
random variable that represents the number of users whose constructed binary vectors are 1’s
for all items in B. If all the n + m users follow the OLH protocol, then for any τz > 0, the
probability that X ≥ τz is bounded as follows:
Pr(X ≥ τz) = 1− Pr(X ≤ τz − 1)
= 1− I(1− qz−1;n+m− τz + 1, τz)
= I(qz−1; τz, n+m− τz + 1) (70)
Note that if we set τz as the threshold, the probability Pr(X ≥ τz) is the false positive rate.
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